Kansas City is trading its first-round pick Thursday night, along with three other picks in the 2021 and 2022 drafts, to the Baltimore Ravens in exchange for Pro Bowl OT Orlando Brown and one pick in the 2021 draft and another in 2022, per sources.
Originally Posted by htismaqe:
Plus Jenkins has many of the same criticisms that Brown has. "He's an NFL right tackle" etc.
The only difference is that Jenkins has never played a down in the NFL and Brown has been to two straight pro bowls.
Not only has Jenkins never played a down in the NFL, he’s only played a few games at LT throughout his entire college career. Brown was a multi year starter at LT for Oklahoma. [Reply]
Originally Posted by TwistedChief:
For those who missed the press conference, this Mellinger column is a good recap of why he was adamant about playing LT:
Good Stuff
He's committed to success at LT...for his Dad, I doubt he fails. [Reply]
Originally Posted by DaneMcCloud:
Based on what, exactly?
The Chiefs didn't exactly acquire OBJ for free. They had to give up their first round pick along with their 3rd and 4th this year and their 5th next year. It won't be long until they're on the hook for at least $20 million per, if not more like $24 million per, for OBJ.
Had Willilams signed a 3 year deal, the Chiefs would have had their full compliment of picks to go along with the best left tackle in the game.
While I'm certainly happy to have such a great consolation prize in OBJ, the Chiefs could have filled far more positions with competent players than the one they filled with the trade, while giving up three additional picks.
Yeah, yeah, they got a 2 and 6 but if Williams was their starting left tackle, they'd have had a 1, 2, 3, 4, 4, 5, 5 and 6th this year, along with their 5th next year.
You have to look at the opportunity cost.
We got a pretty valuable pick back in #58 this year. It's arguably a better pick than 31 just because of the depth in this draft at certain positions.
Plus with Williams, you were looking at investing picks in the future to address the position after he's gone.
While we gave up picks now for Brown, he's going to help us save up picks later because we theoretically won't have to address LT for another 6 or 7 years possibly. [Reply]
Originally Posted by frozenchief:
Film reviews I’ve seen of him describe him as a better pass blocker than run blocker and that Fisher was probably the equivalent in run blocking. TL;DR, we should have better pass blocking and run blocking will be roughly equivalent if not a small step back. PRimary one that sticks out is Keysor Chiefs in the North film review of several games. And Browndid,ok noticeably better pass blocking than run blocking. Maybe it’s just film chosen for review.
Disagree or not. I don’t care. My primary point is that CEH should post noticeably better numbers next year with This line.
Yeah, that's just wrong.
Based on win rates, Brown is about DOUBLE the run blocker that Fisher is. :-) [Reply]
Originally Posted by BossChief:
Has it been confirmed that we can franchise Brown next offseason?
SF couldn’t franchise Trent this offseason as part of the trade last year.
Brown is on a rookie contract. A "no tag" clause would be pretty freaking rare for a former 3rd round pick. Williams was on like his 4th or 5th contact when that got inserted.
Besides, I would think if the Chiefs weren't able to tag him, people wouldn't be reporting that they intend to let him play out his deal and then tag him if they can't sign him. [Reply]
Originally Posted by TRR:
Not only has Jenkins never played a down in the NFL, he’s only played a few games at LT throughout his entire college career. Brown was a multi year starter at LT for Oklahoma.
Originally Posted by htismaqe:
You have to look at the opportunity cost.
We got a pretty valuable pick back in #58 this year. It's arguably a better pick than 31 just because of the depth in this draft at certain positions.
Plus with Williams, you were looking at investing picks in the future to address the position after he's gone.
While we gave up picks now for Brown, he's going to help us save up picks later because we theoretically won't have to address LT for another 6 or 7 years possibly.
I think he might have meant similar. Once you get to that point in the draft not much difference between guys you find end of 1st and 2nd round. [Reply]
You conveniently forgot to highlight the most important part of the sentence:
just because of the depth in this draft at certain positions.
We have needs at DE and WR.
At WR, there's a clear separation between the top 5 guys and the next group of guys.
At DE, there's a ton of quality depth but very little blue chip talent.
Both positions have far better value that will be available at 58 and 63 than at 31. The same could be said of OT but that's water under the bridge now that Brown is in house.
The draft is all about value vs. cost. This draft is extremely thin and the number of 1st round prospects is like half of a normal year. That #31 pick has even less value than it would normally have because of the way this class lays out. [Reply]
Originally Posted by MahomesMagic:
I think he might have meant similar. Once you get to that point in the draft not much difference between guys you find end of 1st and 2nd round.
Not a huge difference in talent but a big difference in cost. [Reply]
Very interesting stuff from Peter King on our trade
Originally Posted by :
Finding a middle ground. Once Baltimore knew KC was sincerely interested, it was a matter of determining the value for the player. Not easy. In 2018, Brown was the 83rd pick overall, chosen in the middle of the third round. In his first three NFL seasons, he played right tackle for the Ravens and made two Pro Bowls. But he wanted to play left tackle, and he would need a new contract with his rookie deal expiring after 2021. So a team acquiring him would not only have to pay draft-pick compensation for him, but would have to sign him in 2022 to avoid making a big trade for a guy and then losing him after only a year or two if KC chose to franchise him in 2022.
Baltimore GM Eric DeCosta and Kansas City GM Brett Veach sought a middle ground. The Ravens thought a pick low in the second round was poor value. Kansas City thought a first-round pick was too rich. So they borderline split the difference. They would try to frame a deal with a value for Brown between the 43rd and 45th pick, approximately—but Kansas City had a low first-round pick (31st overall), and so they’d have to figure out how to equalize the value.
The draft trade value charts. You may have heard of these. Jimmy Johnson and the Cowboys invented the first one in 1989, assigning every pick in the draft a numerical value, so that when a trade was being discussed, each side could put a mathematical number on picks and come to an agreement about the value of them. Johnson’s chart wasn’t perfect; it probably overrated picks in the top 10, didn’t account for the rising value of second and third-round picks in building rosters in recent years, nor did it account for players being traded who might not be with the acquiring team long-term. It was designed to simply dictate what, say, the 34th pick in the draft was worth when two teams were trading picks. When a player got involved, that was a different story. The two sides had to figure the draft-choice equivalent of that player, then work to exchange picks plus the player to make it equal. In this case, Veach had eight to 10 charts he used, while DeCosta had four, and they both had Johnson’s chart. So they began to work on the Chiefs figuring out how to give the Ravens value of a pick in the mid-forties.
The result. On a chart designed by Chase Stuart of Football Perspective, widely quoted by respected scribe Bill Barnwell, adding up KC’s first, third, fourth and fifth-round picks, and getting a Baltimore second in return, was the equivalent of the Ravens getting the 23rd pick in return for Brown. Another chart KC used found that plugging in the same picks resulted in the value of the 75th pick. But then they calculated the Johnson trade chart. Kansas City’s first-round pick, 31st overall, was worth 600 points. The third-round pick, 94th, was worth 124 points, and the fourth, 136th overall, was worth 3.3 points. Add in the fifth next year, about three points, and that totaled up 730.3 points of value. Now you had to account for the Baltimore second-round pick this year, 58th overall, and sixth next year. That was worth about 330.4 points, per Johnson’s chart. So, there was 785.4 points of value from KC’s picks, and 330.4 points from the Baltimore pick. And 785.4 points minus 330.4 equals 455 points. That’s halfway between the 44th and 45th picks on the Johnson chart. So the value seemed fair. The Ravens got the low one plus three lesser picks from Kansas City for a player they’d likely keep just one more year, and KC got the low two plus a left tackle (they hope) of the future.
Postcript. For the Ravens, they figure that the 31st pick they’ve acquired in this draft is not the value of the 31st pick on their board. When they acquired that pick, they think of it more like the 20th or 22nd pick. Why? Because they figure that when their board is stacked with finality this week, there will be a player ranked in the 20 to 22 range left on their board. That comes from experience. Every team doesn’t see the board the way the Ravens see it. The whole thing is fascinating to me.
